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Forced Obstetrical Intervention:
The Role of Religion and Culture and the
Woman’s Autonomous Choice
Gina L. Gribow*
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance our society places on an individual’s autonomy and
right to bodily integrity seems unparalleled as it has been repeatedly noted
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”1 This right to control
one’s own person applies equally to every individual, and thus is an
inherent right held by pregnant women. In the medical context, a pregnant
woman’s right to decide what will be done with her body flows from the
doctrine of informed consent, as she must agree to the proposed medical
treatment.2
Though a pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity is supported by
various constitutional amendments,3 many lawsuits have arisen in the
medical field challenging a woman’s ability to refuse specific medical
treatment when the treatment is deemed necessary to improve or save the
life of the fetus. Often, religion and culture play a central role in either
establishing a basis for why the woman refuses the treatment, or
establishing the context that ultimately leads to forced obstetrical
intervention. Historically, it seems that when religion or culture is heavily
intertwined with the woman’s decision to forgo medical treatment, courts
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1. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
2. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, Autonomy & Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY &
PRACTICE 55, 57 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2009).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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have more strongly favored the interests of the state in protecting the
unborn fetus. Though in recent decisions it appears that courts are
beginning to place greater emphasis on a woman’s inherent right to
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, there is still a lack of a general
consensus in regard to which rights should be valued more highly.
This paper analyzes the rights of pregnant women to refuse specific
medical treatment, and argues that these women become more vulnerable
to forced obstetrical intervention when religion or culture play a central
role in the woman’s decision. The paper proceeds in eight parts. Part II
explores the role that informed consent plays in a pregnant woman’s
personal and informed decision to accept or refuse medical treatment. Part
III examines key protections of a woman’s right to bodily integrity
grounded in the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. Part IV looks at the impact of religion in a pregnant woman’s
decision to forgo medical treatment, and specifically focuses on Jehovah’s
Witnesses and their aversion to blood transfusions. Part V discusses the
effect of culture on a pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity,
particularly looking at instances of forced obstetrical intervention for
Somali women in the United States, and pregnant women who lack access
to comprehensive reproductive health services on the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation. Part VI analyzes the latest major case on this topic,
providing a perspective on how courts are currently addressing maternalfetal conflict. Part VII suggests that this area of law is difficult to
effectively analyze due to inconsistent court decisions and a lack of
available data. Part VIII offers proposed solutions and conclusions.

II. THE ROLE OF INFORMED CONSENT AND PERSONAL
AUTONOMY IN A PREGNANT WOMAN’S CHOICE TO
ACCEPT OR REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Informed consent plays a central role in a pregnant woman’s decision
to comply with or refuse medical treatment. The doctrine of informed
consent encompasses various meanings, and includes the:
legal rules that prescribe behaviors for physicians and other
healthcare professionals in their interactions with patients and
provide for penalties, under given circumstances, if physicians
deviate from those expectations; . . . an ethical doctrine, rooted in
our society’s cherished value of autonomy, that promotes patients’
right of self-determination regarding medical treatment; and . . . an
interpersonal process whereby these parties interact with each other
to select an appropriate course of medical care.4

4. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY & CLINICAL PRACTICE 3
(2d ed. 2001).
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Informed consent generally encompasses the idea that decisions about
the medical care a person receives should be made in a collaborative
manner between the patient and their physician.5 Thus, from the
perspective of a pregnant woman, any medical treatment she receives
should be the result of a mutual understanding between herself and her
doctor.
The ethical justification for informed consent originates from its
promotion of autonomy and well-being.6 Informed consent is effectively
an individual’s “autonomous authorization of a medical intervention or
participation in research.”7 In order for an individual to authorize a
procedure or treatment through an act of informed and voluntary consent, a
person must do more than merely show agreement or comply with a
proposal by a doctor.8 Informed consent only occurs if a patient or subject,
“with substantial understanding, and in the absence of substantial control
by others, intentionally authorizes a professional to do something.”9 In this
respect, a pregnant woman who unequivocally refuses to have a medical
procedure, such as a cesarean or a blood transfusion, should not be
compelled to undergo that procedure, as it would effectively violate the
spirit of informed consent.
The heavy focus on autonomy within the doctrine of informed consent
reflects the importance of bodily integrity, which has been upheld by the
Supreme Court for over a hundred years. In 1891, Justice Gray affirmed
the significance of bodily integrity through his opinion in Union Pacific
Railway Company v. Botsford, quoting Judge Cooley, “[t]he right to one’s
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let alone.”10
Justice Cardozo further expounded upon this idea in relation to informed
consent in 1914, declaring “[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”11 The assertions of both
Justice Gray and Justice Cardozo are illustrative of the personal right to
control one’s body, which is a right that should apply just as much to a
pregnant woman as any other individual.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

BERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.
Id.
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2, at 57.
Id.
Id.
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129–30 (1914).
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III. KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF A PREGNANT
WOMAN’S RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
A. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT SUPPORTED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The autonomous right of every individual to refuse medical treatment
has been upheld in various Supreme Court decisions, and is directly
supported by the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no State
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.”12 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court
relied upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to affirm
the right of competent individuals to exercise their right to refuse medical
procedures.13 In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor highlighted the
individual liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, stating,
“[b]ecause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of
physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due
Process Clause.”14 Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment unmistakably protects a pregnant woman’s right to accept or
refuse certain medical treatment based upon personal beliefs.
B. RIGHT OF PRIVACY GRANTED IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
An individual’s right to privacy is explicitly grounded in the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution,15 and ultimately protects an
individual’s right to bodily integrity.16 In Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, the Court avowed the notion of the right to
privacy, stating:
arising from the same regard for human dignity and selfdetermination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy found
in the penumbra of specific guaranties of the Bill of Rights. As
this constitutional guaranty reaches out to protect the freedom of a
woman to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions, so it
encompasses the right of a patient to preserve his or her right to
privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily integrity in
appropriate circumstances.17
This declaration supports the idea that a pregnant woman, in the role of
a patient, has an implicit right to refuse unwelcomed physical intrusions by

12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
14. Id. at 287.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168, n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (Mass.
1977).
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a doctor. Furthermore, a pregnant woman’s interest in protecting her body
is safeguarded by certain expectations of privacy found within the Fourth
Amendment, specifically “the individual’s legitimate expectations that in
certain places and at certain times he has ‘the right to be let alone—the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.’”18
C. RIGHT TO DETERMINE ONE’S DESTINY ESTABLISHED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Along with a right to privacy, the United States Constitution protects
an individual’s right to religious freedom.19 The First Amendment
provides that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”20 The Supreme Court has
thus explicitly recognized two concepts embodied in the Free Exercise
Clause: the freedom to have a specific religious belief and the freedom to
act in accordance with that religious belief.21
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court affirmed the belief-action
dichotomy intrinsic in the First Amendment, which signaled a trend that the
Court would continue to protect certain religiously motivated conduct from
In Cantwell, the justices unanimously
government interference.22
maintained that a Connecticut statute denied the petitioner his religious
liberty without due process of law, thereby violating both his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.23 The Court further expanded upon the
importance of protecting the right to religious freedom in In re Estate of
Brooks.24 In that case, the Court held that an adult may refuse medical
treatment for religious reasons, even if the decision may seem “unwise,
foolish, or ridiculous.”25 In line with this reasoning, pregnant women
thereby hold the right to decline medical treatment based upon personal
religious beliefs, as that right is safeguarded by the First Amendment of the
Constitution.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
Id.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
Id. at 305.
In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E. 2d 435, 442 (1965).
Id. at 442.
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IV. THE ROLE THAT RELIGION PLAYS IN A PREGNANT
WOMAN’S DECISION TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL
PROCEDURES
A. JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ AVERSION TO BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
1. The Religious Rationale
Jehovah’s Witnesses are a unique challenge to the medical community
because they are bound by religious belief to refuse blood and blood
products,26 which ultimately complicates medical decisions for pregnant
women. Even though Jehovah’s Witnesses accept medical and surgical
treatment, they strongly believe that blood transfusions are forbidden based
upon Biblical passages, such as the passage from Genesis stating, “[o]nly
flesh with its soul—its blood—you must not eat,”27 and the passage from
Acts stating, “[a]bstain from . . . fornication and from what is strangled and
from blood.”28 While these Biblical verses are not written in explicit
medical terms, “[w]itnesses view them as ruling out transfusion of whole
blood, packed RBC’s, and plasma, as well as WBC and platelet
administration.”29 According to Witnesses’ religious understanding,
though, the use of specific components of blood is not expressly prohibited,
and therefore it is up to each individual to make the decision whether or not
they will choose to accept them.30
2. Early Cases Involving Pregnant Jehovah’s Witnesses Refusing
Blood Transfusions: The Triumph of State Interests
Though recent decisions involving the actual rights of pregnant
Jehovah’s Witnesses in medical decisions seem to be grounded in the
autonomy of the individual, early cases are reflective of the notion that the
religious interests of Jehovah’s Witnesses are trumped by other interests
held by the state. In the 1964 case Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson, a hospital sought the authority to administer blood
transfusions to a pregnant woman who was opposed to having the
transfusions due to her religious convictions as a Jehovah’s Witness.31 The
court ultimately held that the unborn child was entitled to the protection of
the law, and that an order would be made to ensure that that woman would
receive blood transfusions if the physician in charge at the time made the
qualified determination that blood transfusions were necessary to save the

26. J. Lowell Dixon & M. Gene Smalley, Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical
Challenge, 246 JAMA 2471, 2471 (1981).
27. Genesis 9:4 (Jehovah’s Witnesses New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures).
28. Acts 15:20 (Jehovah’s Witnesses New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures).
29. Dixon & Smalley, supra note 26, at 2471.
30. Id.
31. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 537 (N.J.
1964).

Winter 2013]

FORCED OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION

183

woman’s life or the life of her child.32 In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied upon previous decisions that emphasized that the concern of
the state for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions
notwithstanding the objection of its parents who were also of the Jehovah’s
Witness faith.33 Moreover, in the case Smith v. Brennan, the same court
had held that a child could sue for injuries that were negligently inflicted
upon it prior to birth.34 Based on these decisions, the court was satisfied
that the unborn child was assured protection by the law, and since the
“welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that
it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between them with
respect to the sundry factual patterns which may develop,” blood
transfusions should be administered to the mother if it is necessary to save
her life or that of the child.35
Twenty years following the decision in Raleigh, the Supreme Court in
New York delivered a similar opinion in In re Jamaica.36 In that case, a
hospital sought an order to compel a woman who was eighteen weeks
pregnant and in critical condition to have a blood transfusion.37 The
woman had previously refused the transfusion based on her beliefs as a
Jehovah’s Witness even though the procedure had been deemed necessary
to stabilize her condition and ultimately save the life of her unborn child.38
The Supreme Court held that the patient’s interest in exercising her
religious beliefs was not sufficient to override the state’s significant interest
in protecting the life of a midterm fetus, which the court classified as a
human being in need of protection.39 The Justice who authored this
opinion noted that although he recognized that:
[T]he fetus in this case is not yet viable, and that the state’s interest
in protecting its life would be less than ‘compelling’ in the context
of the abortion cases, this is not such a case. In this case, the state
has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term
fetus, which outweighs the patient’s right to refuse a blood
transfusion on religious grounds.40
Thus, early court decisions that involved the autonomy rights of
pregnant Jehovah’s Witnesses were grounded in the states’ interest in the
protection of the fetus.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.
Id.
Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.
In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 898.
In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
Id. at 899–900.
Id. at 900.
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3. In re Brown: The Triumph of Personal Autonomy and Liberty
In a 1997 case that addressed the issue of balancing the rights of a
pregnant Jehovah’s Witness who refused medical treatment based on her
religious convictions against the state’s substantial interest in the welfare of
the viable fetus, an appellate court in Illinois declared that the paramount
interest at stake was that of the liberty and personal autonomy of the
woman.41 In re Brown involved a twenty-six-year-old woman Darlene
Brown, a Jehovah’s Witness, who was thirty-four weeks and three days
pregnant.42 During a procedure to remove a urethral mass, Brown lost
more blood than her physicians had anticipated, causing her doctor to order
a blood transfusion.43 Brown, who was fully conscious and alert at the time
the blood arrived, refused the blood, noting that she was a Jehovah’s
Witness.44 Since the doctors believed that Brown competently refused the
transfusion, they finished the surgery using other techniques to control the
bleeding.45 Following the surgery, Brown had an extremely low level of
hemoglobin and although Brown’s doctor tried various alternative medical
procedures, her hemoglobin level continued to drop.46 At the time, her
doctor was of the opinion that if she did not have the blood transfusion,
then her chance of survival, along that with that of the fetus, was only five
percent.47
On account of Brown’s refusal to have a blood transfusion, the State
filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as well as a motion for the
temporary custody of Brown’s fetus.48 The trial court granted the State’s
petition and provided the hospital administrator with the temporary custody
of Brown’s fetus, thereby conferring upon the administrator the right to
consent to a blood transfusion should one of the attending physicians deem
it necessary.49 In the end, the hospital made the decision to proceed with
the blood transfusion, even though Brown adamantly resisted.50 Once it
had been established that Brown had given birth to a healthy baby boy, the
court vacated the temporary custody order, and the case was closed.51
Nonetheless, the appellate court in the First District in Illinois came to
the opposite conclusion, relying on decisions in Stallman v. Youngquist and
In re Baby Boy Doe.52 In Stallman, the court held that a pregnant woman

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill. 1997).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405.
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owes no legally cognizable duty to her developing fetus, as a fetus cannot
have superior rights to that of its mother.53 Expanding upon the reasoning
in Stallman, the Baby Boy Doe court determined that the “Illinois courts
should not engage in a balancing of the maternal and fetal rights such that
‘a woman’s competent choice in refusing medical treatment as invasive as
a cesarean section during her pregnancy must be honored, even in
circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.’”54
Furthermore, the court highlighted that a “woman’s right to refuse invasive
medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and
religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy.”55
Though the opinion in Brown relies heavily upon the arguments
established in In re Baby Boy Doe, it is important to note that the court
departs from In re Baby Boy Doe’s suggestion that a blood transfusion
merely constitutes a “relatively noninvasive and risk-free procedure.”56
The Brown court found that a blood transfusion is, in fact, an invasive
medical procedure that directly interrupts a competent adult’s bodily
integrity.57 Thus, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that Brown should
not have been compelled to undergo the blood transfusion for the benefit of
her viable fetus, thereby upholding a pregnant woman’s right to refuse
medical treatment based upon religious beliefs.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE BROWN AND OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
THE WAY RELIGION IMPACTS OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION
The decision in In re Brown is monumental not only because it
established a new precedent for a line of cases in Illinois on the subject of a
woman’s right to personal autonomy and bodily integrity, but also because
no other appellate court at the time had held that a pregnant woman had the
right to refuse a blood transfusion, particularly due to religious reasons.
While the decision is not binding upon any other state outside of Illinois, it
is likely that the principles enunciated in the Brown decision will be relied
upon by other appellate courts.
Despite the laudable decision in Brown, however, an analysis of the
few decisions that have been published in this line of cases suggests that a
woman’s religious beliefs may ultimately make the woman more
vulnerable to obstetrical intervention. As it was not until 1997 that a court
recognized a woman’s right to refuse medical treatment due to religious
reasons, it seems physicians and courts in these types of cases are inclined
to view a woman’s refusal of specific medical treatment as being grounded
solely in religion, as opposed to personal autonomy. Although this theory

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988).
In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. 1994).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405.
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is not explicitly stated in any recent opinions, it should be noted that “deep
religious discord has been part of America’s social DNA”58 and, therefore,
it is possible that a general lack of understanding or acceptance for certain
religions has served as the driving force behind medical court-orders.

V. THE ROLE THAT CULTURE PLAYS IN AFFECTING A
PREGNANT WOMAN’S RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
A. SOMALI WOMEN’S AVERSION TO CESAREANS
1. Cultural Norms that Shape Somali Women’s Views Regarding
Cesareans
Similar to the way in which religion has caused pregnant women to be
more vulnerable to certain medical decisions made by their physicians and
the courts, cultural norms have also played a role in making women more
susceptible to obstetrical intervention.
This has particularly been
evidenced through cases involving Somali women. Unlike Jehovah’s
Witnesses who refuse to accept blood transfusions, Somali women have a
general aversion to cesareans, which seems to be grounded in their cultural
beliefs.
Somali women place a significant emphasis on pregnancy due to their
religious beliefs, and feel that pregnancy is a blessing from God.59 In
accordance with these beliefs, many Somali women refuse cesareans as
they believe that cesareans may impede subsequent pregnancies and lead to
death.60 The general fear of maternal death is readily substantiated by the
fact that the maternal mortality rate for Somali women is among the highest
in the world.61 Data gathered by the World Health Organization indicates
that in 2006 it was estimated that out of one hundred thousand live births,
one thousand six hundred Somali women would die from childbirth.62
The high maternal mortality rate is reflective of the severe lack of
adequate medical care for Somali women. In Somalia, two-thirds of
women receive no prenatal care, and less than a third have a professional
birth attendant present during birth.63 In a study involving thirty-four
Somali women which focused on the general resistance to common

58. Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN, 1,
4 (Oct. 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Americas-TrueHistory-of-Religious-Tolerance.html.
59. E-Newsletter, KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, (Feb. 2006), http://www.kpha.
us/documents/newsletters/2006WinterNewslet.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) [hereinafter
KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION].
60. Elizabeth Brown et al., “They Get a C-Section . . . They Gonna Die”: Somali
Women’s Fears of Obstetrical Interventions in the United States, 21 J. TRANSCULTURAL
NURSING 220, 224 (2010).
61. Id. at 220.
62. Country Statistics: Somalia, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://rho.emro.who.int/
rhodata/?theme=country&vid=18300# (last visited Sept. 2, 2012).
63. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 220–21.

Winter 2013]

FORCED OBSTETRICAL INTERVENTION

187

prenatal and obstetrical intervention techniques, a young woman stated,
“They have [seizures in Africa] a lot. [Seizures] cause a contraction and
[the woman] don’t have a doctor. The baby is not coming, and they don’t
have any c-section. If [the baby] die or the mother die, that is what
happens.”64 This statement reinforces the concept that cesareans are not
routine medical procedures for Somali women, as whatever may happen to
the child or the mother is believed to be God’s will.65
The study also revealed that most Somali women delivered at home,
and only went to a hospital if there were complications, which is another
prominent reason why Somali women tend to express fears of dying from
cesareans.66 Typically, Somali women only seek hospital care after three to
four days of labor, and only accept obstetrical intervention, such as
cesareans, in rare cases of prolonged labor and when other methods have
Furthermore, the predominant belief among the female
failed.67
participants in the study was that doctors in the United States heavily push
for surgery, as opposed to natural birth.68 One of the women from the
study corroborated this view, stating:
Back home with a midwife, if the kid has a big head and he can’t
come out, [midwife] makes a cut and the kid comes out. [Somali
women] believe here that [doctors] just want to do the surgery.
[Doctors] don’t want to help the baby come out. Back home [if
women] are in labor even for two days, they still have to wait until
the baby comes out. But over here, [doctors] think it’s an
emergency and they just do the c-section; they don’t wait until the
baby come out.69
2. Reported Instances of Court-Ordered Cesareans for Somali Women
in the United States
It is difficult to find actual court orders or case law regarding instances
of forced obstetrical intervention with Somali women in the United States,
particularly as most of the court orders appear to be under seal and are not
accessible to the public.70 Additionally, doctors and hospital employees are
unable to discuss the cases due to potential violations of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).71

64. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 222.
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See discussion infra Part VII.
71. E-mail from Kristi Boldt, M.D., Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Mayo Clinic, to
author (Feb. 14, 2012, 12:41 PST) (on file with author).
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Nevertheless, accounts of court-ordered cesareans have surfaced through
studies that have gathered Somali women into focus groups.72
At the American Public Health Association’s 133rd Annual Meeting
and Exposition in 2005,73 various accounts of court-ordered cesareans were
described. During a medical presentation of a Somali study, one of the
presenters discussed an instance in which a Somali woman had recounted
that she originally refused to be induced as she felt that “God-willing the
baby would come when it was time,” yet was compelled to have a
cesarean.74 A separate instance was additionally described in which
another woman also initially refused a cesarean based upon her
convictions, but was eventually ordered to have the cesarean by her
doctors.75 Following the cesarean, the women’s baby was taken away from
her as she was deemed to be an “unfit” mother on account of her original
refusal to have the cesarean.76
3. Observations Regarding the Differences in Beliefs that Exist
Between American Physicians and Their Somali Patients
The purpose behind forming focus groups specifically tailored to
Somali women and their pregnancy was to identify the reasons for the
differences in beliefs and opinions that exist between American physicians
and their Somali patients.77 As Somali women are not native to the United
States, their cultural views are not well understood, nor do they appear to
be well respected. The general lack of understanding of the Somali culture
displayed by American physicians may lead to Somali women feeling
helpless in resisting medical treatment. Thus, though documented accounts
of forced obstetrical intervention with Somali women in the United States
have been challenging to find, it is readily apparent that the cultural beliefs
of these women make them vulnerable to certain American medical
practices.
B. THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX RESERVATION: LACK OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH SERVICES ON THE RESERVATION AND COERCED INDUCED
LABOR
1. Allegations of Insufficient Reproductive Health Services and
Coerced Induced Labor
Analogous to the way that Somali women may feel powerless to
challenge medical decisions in the United States based upon a difference in

72. KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, supra note 59.
73. Julka Almquist, MPH, Division of Epidemiology, Address at the American Public
Health Association’s 133rd Annual Meeting and Exposition (Dec. 12, 2005).
74. E-mail from Mary Barger, Assistant Professor, Department of Family Health Care
Nursing to author (Jan. 30, 2012, 04:30 PST) (on file with author).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. KANSAS PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, supra note 59.
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cultural views, pregnant women on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation
feel defenseless to challenge the terms of their labor and delivery which are
dictated by Indian Health Services (IHS).78 For more than a decade,
pregnant women who reside on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation
have not only faced the burden of having to travel more than ninety miles
for labor and delivery, since there is no birthing unit on the reservation, but
have also been consistently induced without sufficient consideration.79 On
account of the challenges faced by pregnant women on the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against IHS on September 29,
2010.80 The FOIA suit was filed in an effort to obtain information
regarding the reproductive health care services available to women on the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation so that appropriate changes could be
made to provide women with the services they need.81
The actual complaint explicitly notes that IHS has failed to meet the
United States government’s treaty obligations regarding providing
appropriate health care services to American Indians and Alaska Natives.82
Although IHS is entrusted with fulfilling certain duties to provide specific
health care services, there has been a significant lack of comprehensive
obstetrical care at any IHS facility on the reservation since 2001.83
Moreover, though there had originally been plans to build a new birthing
unit on the reservation, the plans never came to fruition.84 Since the
birthing unit has not been built, the majority of pregnant women on the
reservation who would be eligible for care under IHS are forced to travel
ninety miles to a healthcare center in South Dakota for labor and delivery.85
Due to poor road conditions, this trip can take over two hours.86
In addition to the fact that women on the reservation are compelled to
travel long distances for delivery, “some of these women report that they
are being told they must forgo natural labor and delivery, and instead take
medication to induce labor—with little or no notice, explanation, or
counseling, and at a time selected exclusively by their doctor (sometimes
even before their due date).”87 Since these women are beholden to IHS for
medical services, they typically feel powerless to refuse to be induced on

78. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1–2, ACLU v. Indian Health Serv. No. 10-07388
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/reproductive-freedom/aclu-vindian-health-services-complaint.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2.
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the terms laid out by their physician.88 Furthermore, the fact that the
physician authorizes the induction on his/her own terms leads to instances
where families are not able to be present during delivery because of
insufficient advance notification.89
While labor, in other contexts, is sometimes induced for logistical
reasons, no medical group or organization recommends mandatory
inductions for rural women without taking into account their personal
preferences or circumstances.90 This argument is asserted in the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ (ACOG) August 2009 clinical
guidelines regarding inductions, which state that a patient should always be
counseled regarding the indications for induction and the possible need for
repeat induction, or cesarean delivery as a result.91 Additionally, ACOG
recommends that at least twelve to eighteen hours of latent labor should be
allowed before elective induction in order to reduce the risk of cesarean
delivery.92
2. The Outcome of the Lawsuit and Current Status for Pregnant
Women on the Reservation
The ACLU’s FOIA filing did not gain much momentum and the
lawsuit did not lead to any actual changes in the way that pregnancies are
handled on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation.93 Alexa KolbiMolinas, the staff attorney who filed the complaint on behalf of the ACLU,
claims that the only response she received from IHS was an IHS manual,
which details IHS-specific policies and also includes procedural
instructions.94 As there is no written policy in the manual that provides for
comprehensive reproductive health services on a reservation, this proved to
be a major contributing factor to the defeat of this lawsuit.95 Nevertheless,
Kolbi-Molinas still believes that this issue is actionable since there is a
treaty obligation to provide services.96
Though no further actions are being filed at the moment, it is likely that
this issue will be relitigated.97 The federal government does not have the
right to deprive Native American women of the ability to make an
informed and autonomous decision regarding their medical care based upon
the fact that they live in a rural area and are obliged to rely on IHS for

88.
89.
90.
91.

Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 78, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Clinical Management Guidelines for Obstetrician-Gynecologists, ACOG PRAC.
BULL. (Comm. on Practice Bulletins—Obstetrics, The Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2009, at 4.
92. Id.
93. Telephone Interview with Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, ACLU Counsel (Feb. 6, 2012).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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health care. The practice of coercing women to take medication to induce
labor undoubtedly violates both a woman’s fundamental right to privacy
and bodily integrity.

VI. MOST RECENT CASE INVOLVING MATERNAL-FETAL
CONFLICT AND MEDICAL-DECISION MAKING DURING
PREGNANCY
A. BURTON V. FLORIDA (2009)
There is still no consensus regarding the way courts treat cases that pit
a woman’s right to refuse medical treatment against the state’s interest in
protecting fetal health. The most recent decision in this line of cases,
Burton v. Florida, surfaced in a Florida state court in March of 2009.98 In
Burton, Samantha Burton, who was pregnant and who already had two
children, voluntarily sought medical treatment after she developed
complications during her twenty-fifth week of pregnancy.99 Her attending
physician strongly recommended that she follow a course of care that
would postpone her pregnancy, which included medication, inpatient
monitored bed rest, and physician supervision of physical activity,
smoking, and diet.100 Instead of following these recommendations, Ms.
Burton sought to be discharged from the hospital, prompting the hospital to
seek assistance from the state to attempt to force her to comply with the
recommended form of care.101 In response, the state appointed a private
lawyer to act as special assistant state attorney in the case, and the lawyer
filed an emergency petition seeking judicial authorization to force Ms.
Burton to comply with the recommended treatment.102 Later the same day,
the court initiated an emergency hearing by telephone with Ms. Burton in
which Ms. Burton represented herself from her hospital room without the
assistance of counsel.103 Shortly following this telephone hearing, the court
granted the state’s petition as the court reasoned that the state had parens
patriae authority to ensure that children receive medical treatment that is
necessary for the preservation of their life and health, and further that
between a parent and a child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the
controlling factor in any decision.104
On account of the court’s decision to recognize the state’s parens
patriae authority, Ms. Burton’s providers were authorized to bestow upon
her the medical care and treatment that they deemed necessary to preserve

98. Kate Wevers, Burton v. Florida: Maternal-Fetal Conflicts and Medical Decision
Making During Pregnancy, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 436, 436 (2010).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the life and health of the unborn child.105 Within the context of appropriate
medical treatment and care, the providers were permitted to mandate
permanent bed rest, administer necessary medication, and ultimately
perform a cesarean delivery a few days following the court’s order.106
Following the cesarean, which resulted in a stillbirth, Ms. Burton
promptly appealed the original court order.107 Even though the issue as it
applied to Ms. Burton was moot, her appeal raised issues concerning the
rights of pregnant women that are likely to reappear in future litigation.108
In the appeal, The Florida District Court overruled the Burton trial court,
effectively ruling that Ms. Burton’s rights had been violated when she was
forced to remain hospitalized against her will after she disagreed with the
prescribed treatment.109 In reaching its decision, the appellate court found
that the trial court misapplied the law from M.N. v. Southern Baptist
Hospital of Florida when it rested its decision upon the holding “that as
between parent and child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the controlling
factor.”110 Unlike Burton, M.N. did not involve the rights of a pregnant
women, but rather a parents’ refusal of consent for a blood transfusion and
chemotherapy for their son.111
The appellate court in Burton further noted that “[t]he test to overcome
a woman’s right to refuse medical intervention in her pregnancy is whether
the state’s compelling state interest is sufficient to override the pregnant
woman’s constitutional right to the control of her person, including her
right to refuse medical treatment.”112 The compelling interest must be
“narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible to safeguard the
rights of the individual,”113 and the state’s interest does not become
compelling until viability.114 Thus, the court enunciated a strict test that
must be met before restricting a woman’s freedom to personal autonomy,
and since the state did not show any evidence of viability, the balancing
test was not triggered.
B.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BURTON

Though the recent Burton decision upholds a pregnant woman’s
autonomous right to bodily integrity, the decision is not binding upon any
state outside of Florida. As the Burton case was ultimately decided by a
Florida District Court of Appeal, its decision only established precedent for

105.
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Wevers, supra note 98, at 436.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id.
Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., 648 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
Burton, 49 So. 3d at 266.
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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the courts under its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, other states can look to this
recent decision as a basis for continuing to uphold a pregnant woman’s
right to accept or refuse medical treatment, whether their decision is based
upon religious, cultural, or merely personal reasons.

VII. CHALLENGES THAT ARISE IN THIS
AREA OF LEGAL ANALYSIS
When researching previous cases that deal with obstetrical intervention
and a woman’s inherent right to bodily integrity, numerous challenges arise
which make it difficult to effectively conduct a proper analysis of the issues
at hand. One of the main problems is that there are not many published
decisions to rely upon. The lack of published decisions is probably the
result of many factors, but the main problem is likely that there is not
enough time for a judge to actually write the decision. When a hospital
files a motion to allow doctors to perform a medical procedure without the
consent of the woman, it is normally under circumstances where there is a
time-sensitive medical procedure at stake. For example, in instances of
court-ordered cesareans, if a doctor determines it is necessary for a woman
to have a cesarean immediately in order to save the life of the baby, an
entire lawsuit cannot unfold. A decision by a judge needs to be made as
quickly as possible. Therefore, an articulate and expansive decision by a
judge is not feasible.
As decisions tend to be made in the moment, many are ultimately
reversed through appeals. A clear example of this is the Burton case in
which the trial court originally made an emergency decision declaring that
Ms. Burton could be compelled to comply with her physician’s orders
based solely upon a phone conversation with the judge.115 This
instantaneous ruling did not afford the judge ample time to efficiently
analyze the facts of the case, resulting in Ms. Burton being forced to have a
cesarean. In the appeal, however, the court had both the necessary
resources and the time to fully weigh the interests at hand, ultimately ruling
that Ms. Burton’s initial autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment
should have been respected.116 Despite the fact that Ms. Burton was
successful in her appeal, for patients like Ms. Burton, the damage had
already been done. Thus, the appeals process proves to be ineffective in
restoring a woman’s right to bodily integrity once it has already been
violated.
Another issue that may arise in researching this type of case is that
documents or court orders are sealed, and therefore not accessible to the

115. Wevers, supra note 98.
116. Id.
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public.117 Courts will sometimes decide to keep parts of proceedings
confidential if they have a justifiable basis for doing so.118 Such bases
often arise in the medical context.119 If a proceeding is made confidential,
then any transcript made of the proceedings will be regarded as a sealed
record.120 Moreover, potential violations of HIPAA prevent doctors and
other hospital employees from discussing certain cases, such as evidenced
with court-ordered cesareans with Somali women.121 It is likely that due to
the personal nature of many of the cases involving forced obstetrical
intervention, records are sealed, thereby making it difficult to ascertain the
frequency of and reasoning behind forced obstetrical interventions.

VIII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Despite the numerous challenges that arise in researching this line of
cases, viable solutions exist that would not only alleviate these challenges,
but also directly address the problem at hand regarding the need to uphold a
pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity. One solution is to implement
mandatory annual education sessions on recent appellate decisions in this
line of cases for the obstetrics and gynecology divisions within hospitals.
Doctors and nurses working in the obstetrics and gynecology divisions, for
instance, should be well versed in the recent decisions in both In re Brown
and Burton. If they were provided with this knowledge, it is likely that
these hospital employees would feel less inclined to compel pregnant
women to undergo certain medical procedures. Moreover, this may lead to
doctors having a better understanding of different religious and cultural
views, thereby creating more respect for their individual patients.
Not only should hospital staff within the obstetrics and gynecology
divisions be knowledgeable in recent appellate decisions, but judges
nationwide should also be well-educated in these decisions. Biannual
judicial education programs should be mandated in an effort to ensure that
judges are cognizant of the movement towards upholding a pregnant
woman’s right to autonomy. As cases in this area of the law tend to be
complex, particularly when religion or culture play a role, judges need to
be well-informed of recent decisions in order to distinguish between sound
and invalid arguments. Furthermore, it is important that judges have a
comprehensive understanding of various religious and cultural views.

117. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET
GUIDE 1– 2 (Federal Judicial Center ed. 2010).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. E-mail from Kristi Boldt, supra note 71.
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The most effective solution, apart from mandating educational
programs, is to have Congress, or each separate state legislature, pass a law
explicitly stating that pregnant women have an inherent right to bodily
integrity. If a law actually existed that conferred upon all pregnant women
the right to choose whether to refuse or accept medical treatment, courts
and hospitals would no longer need to engage in a balancing test between
the interests of the state in protecting the fetus and the woman’s interest in
maintaining her right to autonomy.
B. CONCLUSIONS
As the cases discussed above reveal, the courts have not reached a
general agreement in regard to the way they weigh a pregnant woman’s
right to bodily integrity against the state’s interest in protecting the life of
her fetus. When religion or culture play a role in the decision or context of
the medical decision at stake, the court’s interests appear to shift towards
protecting the life of the fetus, ultimately making the woman more
vulnerable to obstetrical intervention. Though it is reassuring that some of
the most recent decisions in this field of the law have ultimately upheld a
woman’s right to choose whether to accept or refuse medical treatment
based on personal or religious reasons, it seems highly likely that this issue
will continue to arise as there has been no precedent established by the
Supreme Court which is directly on point.
The current challenges that arise in this area of legal analysis
demonstrate that the nature of these lawsuits may continue to prove to be
irresolvable, as decisions are made in a very short period of time without
being given sufficient consideration, and documents tend to be sealed.
Given this information, it follows that there are likely many more instances
of court-ordered obstetrical interventions in the United States, yet the
decisions are not documented or made available to the public.
In conclusion, though it seems that a woman’s right to bodily integrity
is being emphasized more heavily, courts need to establish, and
consequently follow, a uniform procedure of analysis when approaching
these cases, particularly when religion and culture are involved. Should the
proposed solutions listed above not be implemented, courts should look
directly to the recent decisions in In re Brown and Burton and use them as
models for upholding a woman’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity.
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